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 Whether it concerns oil drilling or gold mining, sometimes a government, facing 
new circumstances, must change its mind. 
This reality creates a tension in law between encouraging stability and allowing 
adaptation to new information and new situations. The “gold rush” CAFTA lawsuits1 
against El Salvador reveal this tension. 
 Pacific Rim, a Canadian-based mining firm, has brought one of two gold mining 
lawsuits against El Salvador under CAFTA.2 Since the early 2000s, Pacific Rim has spent 
money looking for gold in El Salvador. It did so under exploration (but notably not 
exploitation) licences that were issued in 1996 and that Pacific Rim acquired in 2002. A 
few years later, after Pacific Rim decided where it wanted to dig, the government had 
adopted a more cautious position on gold mining. 
So, Pacific Rim has invoked its privilege – uniquely available to foreign investors 
under international law, via investment treaties – to sue El Salvador. It argues that the 
government should have allowed it to mine for gold; the government responds that 
Pacific Rim failed to satisfy steps in the approvals process, including an acceptable 
environmental assessment. Pacific Rim seeks at least $77 million for its costs and hoped-
for profits. 
 El Salvador is a small, poor country with precariously few water resources. It lost 
20% of its surface water in the past 20 years, and 95% of the rest is reportedly 
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 CAFTA is short for the United States-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, 
signed in 2004.  
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 The second lawsuit is by U.S.-based Commerce Group Corporation. I focus on the Pacific Rim case here 
because there is more information publicly available about it. 
contaminated.3 Industrial gold mining is a recent prospect for the country, and there are 
serious concerns about the risks it poses to people’s health and livelihoods, especially 
their access to clean water. 
 How should the tension here between stability and change be resolved? 
 On the one hand, it seems unfair that a company that put money into exploration 
should be frustrated when applying for permission to exploit what it has found. On the 
other hand, all mining companies must be aware that a government might change its 
approach over time to health and environmental risks of mining. If taxpayers had to 
compensate everyone who lost out in bets on the social or environmental feasibility of a 
project, this would disadvantage those who are more prudent, patient, or environmentally 
conscious. 
The question of how the arbitrators in Pacific Rim v El Salvador might resolve 
this tension is challenging to answer. Although not the fault of the arbitrators, it raises 
some important concerns. 
 First, under CAFTA and other investment treaties, the constraints put on 
governments are both exceptionally potent and highly malleable. This makes it very 
important, and yet very difficult, to assess the legal standards that will apply in particular 
cases. In numerous awards to date, tribunals have interpreted provisions on expropriation, 
national treatment and fair and equitable treatment in starkly divergent ways. In turn, they 
have fueled high-stakes uncertainty in the evaluation of policy space and litigation risk. 
 Second, investment treaties rely on the remedy of damages in cases often 
stemming from difficult judgment calls by governments in complex areas of policy. This 
can put arbitrators in a bind. Do they order a state to pay damages after finding that it 
violated an unclear rule? Or do they dismiss the claim, leaving the investor reeling after a 
long, expensive arbitration? Compared to other forms of public law judging, the system 
gives few options to respond to government conduct that is characterized, well after the 
fact, as unlawful. 
Third, the use of arbitrators instead of judges to decide basic tensions in public 
policy makes it essential that the process be credible and independent. However, 
investment treaty arbitration lacks key safeguards of independence that apply to courts, 
including security of tenure, an objective method of assigning judges to specific cases, 
and checks on income-earning activities outside of the judicial role. 
This invites unsavoury questions. What are the business interests of the arbitrators 
chosen to decide a case? With whom might they have a common outlook at the 
International Chamber of Commerce, ICSID and others that wield key powers over 
arbitrator appointments? By allowing the arbitration industry to make final decisions in 
matters of public law, investment treaties remove longstanding safeguards that protect 
judges from economic and financial entanglement and that ensure public confidence in 
the courts. 
How should governments respond? One option is to re-introduce a mediating role 
for domestic courts, including perhaps the courts of neutral states not involved in a 
specific dispute. Another is to look for ways to re-introduce safeguards of judicial 
independence, such as by designating a roster of eminent jurists, drawn from outside the 
commercial arbitration industry, from which arbitrators would be chosen. 
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On the rules, governments could clarify that investment treaties are designed to 
offer an exceptional remedy in cases of serious abuse or targeted discrimination against a 
foreign investor, but not a wide-ranging opportunity to challenge general laws and 
policies. Nearly all government measures harm some people while helping others, not 
because this is the aim of the regulation but because all general decisions, by definition, 
have ripple effects across the economy and society. Requiring public compensation for 
those foreign investors who are “harmed” by a general measure skews markets, as well as 
regulation, by inappropriately privileging one group of private interests over all others. 
There are various ways to address the lack of independence, fairness and 
coherence in investment treaty arbitration. But the root questions are familiar. How 
should the tension in law between stability and change be resolved, and by whom? 
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